Fichte rejects freedom on the, perhaps novel, grounds that it is a variety of doubt, and therefore to be despised as falling short of life proper:
"Freedom, understood as a lack of decisiveness when faced with several equal possibilities, is not life, but only a forecourt, a way in, to real life. At some time or other one has to make a choice, and act upon that choice, and it is then that life begins."
"7th Address: A More Detailed Treatment of the Aboriginality of the Germanness of a People", Addresses to the German Nation (Hackett: Indianapolis, 2013), p 88.
Accepting Fichte's view, we might say that those who avoid doubt are failing to approach in the correct way, and trying to break in to life through the back door.
Alternatively, quarrelling with Fichte, we might object that, like it or not, much of any life is necessarily lived in the forecourt, because of the constrained epistemological capacities of our bodies, and also as the result of our inescapable and decaying position in the thermodynamic trajectory of the universe, the entropy of the universal system determining and limiting what can be known within it. In spite of Fichte's assertion, doubt is most certainly life, and much under-appreciated, not only by Fichte, it is true, but also by those who deprecate reflection as a mere prelude or needless addition to the fully lived life, Lawrence perhaps, or those who seem take the forceful expression of a judgment, a literary evaluation for example, for a measure of its vigour, such as Leavis, who on reflection begins to look less and less English the more I think about it.