It is commonplace to refer to science as the religion of our age, but this is wrong in the sense that it fails to capture those differences we actually observe; but it is understandable as a response to the overstatement of difference between the network of propositions we see in a snapshot of early 12th Century life, say, and that available to us today. There is more continuity here than the advocates of 'science' will admit, and the assertion of that continuity is an important truth. But to do so by describing science as just our version of religion goes well beyond this into satire by attempting to erode respect for science, to cut it down to size, or put it on a level with religion. But this is futile; the technological power of scientific propositions is manifestly superior and undeniable.
Nevertheless, the continuity must be respected, and accounted for, in our theory, and a simple and just way of achieving this end is to see religion as the science, or part of the science of the past, and very poor science too.
The particular merits of this approach are:
a) No difference of kind is asserted, but degrees of quality constituting difference are recognised.
b) No difference of kind in psychological experience of science and religion is asserted, but difference in complexity and in consistency with experience of the world, or evidence, is recognised. (In other words, both can seem entirely normal to the subject, but the lack of complexity in the religious view is noted, as is is lack of correspondence with the world.)
c) No difference of kind in the network of propositions is asserted, but improvements in the principle of extensionality are recognised, as is flexibility in the face of error. (I.e. the religious network tends to be systematic in the sense that faulty propositions tend to drag down many other connected propositions. Then when facts challenge religious propositions, the priests and other interested parties will resist the facts. This is also true of modern science, notoriously so in fact, but it is so to a much lesser degree; indeed it is statistically true, rather than absolutely so, that science changes under pressure from the facts.)
In summary, the continuity between states of knowledge is best recognised by granting that our science has improved over time. In the states that we think of as 'religious' it was extremely poor, today it is relatively better, though with many areas in which improvement is possible. It is better in the sense that, statistically not absolutely, our network of propositions and the use we make of them is flexibly responsive to the facts of the world as we can see them, and delivers greater technological power.